🟢 Proposal: KAIA Chain Inflation Adjustment via Vote-Integrated Stake-weighted Aggregation (VISTA)

1⃣ Proposal Details

  1. Introduce a governance voting system where inflation rates are determined by stake-weighted voting averages.
  2. Execute quarterly governance votes, allowing each member to select an inflation rate from predefined options between 2.0%–10.0% in increments of 0.5%.
  3. Implement safeguards limiting changes per cycle to ±1% of the current inflation rate.
  4. Establish a 5-of-7 multisig veto mechanism (quorum adjustable).
  5. Exclude the highest and lowest voting options (those most distant from the current rate) from the calculation to prevent extreme fluctuations.
  6. Consider only votes from governance members who have participated (including abstentions) in at least 3 of the last 4 governance votes for averaging.

2⃣ Rationale and Expected Benefits

  1. Fixed inflation can quickly become imbalanced due to market shifts:
  • Excessive rewards: If token issuance remains high despite declining on-chain metrics (TVL, transaction activity, burn rate), token scarcity is undermined.
  • Insufficient rewards: Conversely, maintaining low issuance during high on-chain activity can weaken validator incentives, threaten network security, and discourage new or existing participants.
  1. Binary yes/no voting can burden governance members, leading to abstentions.
  • Example: Solana’s SIMD-228 proposal to decide inflation rates through yes/no votes was rejected.
  1. VISTA reduces voter burden by averaging multiple options, lowering participation barriers.
  2. Dynamic inflation management can balance validator rewards and token value, achieving equilibrium between reward incentives and scarcity.

3⃣ Key Parameters

4⃣ References
As a new user, I’m restricted from posting links. Please refer to the original post for the link.(https://x.com/Doboongkun/status/1927234642693738920)

  1. Galaxy Research (2025), GitHub Discussion on ‘MESA’ Proposal
  2. Solana SIMD-228 Inflation Reduction Discussion
  3. Cointelegraph Article on Galaxy Digital Proposal
9 Likes

First of all, it’s super exciting to see that this GP is driven by the community. As a strong supporter and contributor of KAIA, I’d love to share my thoughts as well.

I’d like to look at it from 3 perspectives:

1. On Dynamic Inflation

I’d agree that a dynamic inflation system is more flexible and better reflects market conditions.

But I’m not convinced that letting validators vote on inflation is the best way to implement it. We can’t expect validators will act in good will, and they will naturally seek to maximize their own incentives. And given the current staking distribution, it’s likely that top validators will end up having major decisions (of course, we can set some min/max weight restrictions).

Instead, we may need a more concrete, standardized approach. For example, the total staked KAIA can act as a good standard since this metric reflects more than just numbers:
- Is the KAIA incentive still attractive?
- Is KAIA’s DeFi ecosystem active?
- Is the KAIA widely used in the ecosystem?
- Is KAIA considered a reliable asset?

Also, we need to consider that we currently have more like fixed “mining”, not fixed “inflation”. For example, the inflation rate will naturally become 4.7% from the current 5% after a year. In a way, this already partially has characteristics of dynamic inflation (Even if it’s not in the way we want).

2. On GP Implementation

I’m a bit unclear on the “5-of-7 multisig veto” mechanism. Could you elaborate more on this?

Personally, I think changing the inflation rate by 1% every quarter feels a bit too aggressive, especially considering our current inflation rate is around 5%. A smaller step like 0.1%, or even adjusting it proportionally (e.g., reduce by 1% of current inflation: 5% → 4.95%) might make more sense.

As I mentioned on X (https://x.com/Cryptoed_Lewis/status/1927679717856915687), we already have mechanisms to adjust inflation (and almost all network parameters) via on-chain governance. This GP includes more details like staking-weighted voting and participation rules, but if it might be worth reviewing how the current system works and if it can cover this GP before moving ahead.

3. My personal View

I understand the concerns around KAIA’s inflation, but personally, I think we should also be looking at reward distribution.

I don’t believe the 5% inflation itself is a major issue. What’s more important is how that 5% is split: Fund (KIF/KEF):Proposer:Staker = 5:1:4.

As a developer, I’ll leave the financial (fund) things to others, but I do want to point out one thing: the validator APR drops significantly as they stake more. That’s a clear misalignment between validator incentives and network goals. And it’ll only get worse if we go permissionless, since anyone could cherry-pick the reward scheme.

Based on this, I believe we need to revisit the current reward distribution and consensus algorithm (currently it’s more like PoA) for our permissionless. With a proper transition, validator APR can stabilize, incentive alignment improves, and reward-related concerns will likely be resolved. Then we can have a more productive discussion about inflation itself.

But since moving to permissionless will take time, maybe we can first address the reward split as a short-term solution. If there’s broad agreement, we can discuss specific numbers together.


We need to take a careful, thoughtful approach—this will have a huge impact on the ecosystem. And I want anyone to tackle me on this. Thanks again for your engagement and active participation!

8 Likes

Hello, Community Members.

I deeply resonate with Lewis’s opinion and am pleased to participate in this crucial discussion regarding the future of KAIA. I have organized my thoughts below; please feel free to point out any inaccuracies.

My Opinions on KAIA Inflation and Reward Structure

I believe that inflation itself plays a vital role in maintaining the attractiveness of staking. KAIA’s current inflation rate is low or comparable to other L1 chains with lower market caps (such as newcomers Bera, Initia, etc.). Therefore, I don’t think a significant change to the reward rate itself is necessary. However, I believe it is crucial that this inflation is utilized effectively. As Lewis mentioned, I believe that improvements to the validator selection probability in the consensus algorithm and the block reward distribution structure should be prioritized.

A Radical Proposal: Improving the Reward Distribution Structure

Here, I would like to offer a somewhat radical proposal. I want to emphasize beforehand that this is not presented as the only solution, but rather as a suggestion to encourage diverse opinions and find a point of consensus.

  1. Improving Validator Selection Probability:
  • To create a structure that the general public can understand and agree with, it would be beneficial to introduce a “common sense” validator selection probability structure, similar to other dPoS chains.
  1. Improving Block Reward Distribution Structure:
  • Instead of the current structure where 10% of the block reward is immediately given to the block proposer, I propose changing it to a system that encourages commission competition. This would involve adjusting the reward ratio between stakers and the funds (KIF/KEF) to approximately 95:5.

Reasons for this Proposal:

  • Sufficient Treasury Funds: There are currently about 400 million KAIA accumulated in the treasury.
  • Spending Analysis: Excluding the initial expenses at the time of the merger and annualizing the spending over the 8 months post-merger, the estimated annual expenditure is around 120 million KAIA. This represents 40% of the 5% inflation (300 million KAIA) on the current 6 billion supply. This calculation suggests that accumulating just 20% of the inflation would have been sufficient.
  • Future Outlook: Assuming a bright future where KAIA’s token value increases (I really want to make this assumption!) and that additional expenses are likely to be fixed costs, the current 400 million KAIA in the treasury, plus a portion of the annual 5% inflation (around 15 million KAIA), could sustain operations for at least 4 years, even assuming 120 million KAIA in annual spending. If the price increases, the number of KAIA needed could decrease further.
  • Increased Transparency: If current, somewhat unclear expenditures become transparent and are managed appropriately, we could potentially sustain operations for 5-6 years or even longer, not just 4.

Proposals for Expanding Governance Participation

Additionally, I would like to offer suggestions to vitalize governance participation:

  1. Allowing General User Proposals: It would be beneficial to introduce a system, similar to Cosmos SDK-based chains, where general users can submit proposals by paying a deposit.
  2. Adding a Direct Voting Option: Currently, only indirect voting through the GC (Governance Council) is possible. It would be good to add an option for individual users to vote directly, even if they have delegated their stake. In the current structure, if a delegated validator doesn’t participate in a vote, the user’s opinion isn’t reflected, and this needs improvement.

Conclusion

In summary, I believe KAIA’s inflation rate should be maintained at its current level, but the reward distribution structure and governance participation methods must be improved to enhance the ecosystem’s long-term sustainability. I hope to see more active proposal submissions not only from foundation members but also from general users, and I extend my gratitude to Doboongkun for initiating this discussion on the forum.

These are my thoughts. If there are any factual errors or areas for improvement in my opinions, please provide feedback at any time. Thank you.

9 Likes

Thank you for the proposal. Personally, I like the idea of adopting a variable inflation rate that adjusts according to the chain’s conditions, rather than maintaining a fixed rate. For context, the current Kaia chain allows for adjustments to the inflation rate—specifically, the number of KAIA tokens minted per block—through GC voting.

To advance this proposal as a formal governance agenda, it must either receive an endorsement from at least one GC member or be directly proposed by a GC member.

That said, before proceeding to the voting stage, it would be beneficial to further discuss this topic with more GC members and the broader community. The Foundation will actively participate in these discussions and assist in preparing a formal governance proposal.

8 Likes

내용은 중요하지 않다고 봅니다!! 주인의식을 가지고 조언.행동 하는게 무엇보다 간절한때

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아멘…믿고 조용히 때를 기다립니다. 가즈앗

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오랜만에 재단과 의미있는 토론을 나눈거같네요 화이팅입니다.

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카이아 다시 한번 부활하자~!!! 화이팅

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백의종군하겠습니다. 늘 응원합니다. (사실 벼슬이나 직위 없음)

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변동인플레부분에서 공감하네요
화이팅입니다

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카이아 홀더로서 도봉쿤 파파는 GOAT다
카이아 꼭 폼 되찾길…!

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카이아 봄날은 온다
그날이 언제 일지는 모르지만…..

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카이아 홀더분들 파이팅 입니다 가즈아!!!

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좋은 방향의 ㅜ토론입니다. 이런 토론이 더 활발하게 이루어지면 좋갰네요

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Doboonkung님 제안처럼 카이아 진짜 일 좀 제대로 해봅시다!

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제안에 모두 공감합니다. 카이아는 보상 구조와 거버넌스 참여를 좀 더 확대하라!

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Really agree. kaia 잘되면 좋겠습니다. 서상만 장관님 좀더 홀더말 귀기울여주세요

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좋은 제안입니다. 이런 건설적인 커뮤니티 분위기 좋습니다

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Thank you all for your interest and feedback. Reading your comments has significantly shaped my perspective.

First, I understand and share your concern that weighting votes based on staked amounts could lead governance members (validators) to favor maximizing their personal interests over the collective good of the chain.

Regarding the existing functionality from the Klaytn era to adjust inflation rates, while technically present, it’s essentially a half-measure—unused and dormant due to institutional shortcomings. We haven’t yet practically utilized or seriously discussed this functionality, making it effectively incomplete.

As I’ve repeatedly emphasized, changing inflation rates is a very weighty issue for governance members to propose or decide upon independently. Therefore, I suggest establishing a more formal institutional mechanism to reduce the burden on governance members and to enhance or even mandate participation in inflation-related discussions.

So, I propose a new approach inspired by the dot-plot system used by the Federal Reserve. The concept of quarterly adjustments to inflation remains the same, but governance members would only provide their opinions. The foundation, acting as the chair, would finalize the inflation rate.

The governance members’ role would be to propose their optimal inflation rates for the KAIA Chain numerically. These suggestions would then form a dot plot, clearly identifying which member supports each figure.

The foundation would determine the inflation rate based on this dot plot. Additionally, it would provide a written explanation of its decision, ensuring transparency and continuity. Such records would become valuable assets for our chain.

Shifting from a governance member-centered approach to a foundation-centered one reflects a reconsideration of responsibilities and contributions. The foundation has the largest stake, contributes the most significantly, and bears ultimate responsibility for all changes. Realistically, no individual or governance member can shoulder the consequences of such crucial decisions; only the foundation can meaningfully do this.

Of course, since this is a governance process, the final inflation value proposed by the foundation must still undergo an on-chain vote. A potential concern here is the risk of continuous vote rejections due to perception gaps among participants, which could prevent reaching consensus.

Interestingly, despite extensive private discussions about inflation, I’m the first to formally bring this topic to the forum. I’m genuinely pleased to have initiated this dialogue and hope this effort paves the way for a structured institutional framework.

Retail users like myself face clear limitations, making it essential for governance members and the foundation to take the lead in structuring this initiative. Until this proposal is refined into an official governance agenda, I’ll actively contribute, offer feedback, and promote its importance.

This revised proposal significantly differs from my initial post, and some of you might prefer the original. I encourage you to thoroughly consider both proposals and share your insights.

@lewis_kim Regarding absolute values vs. percentages (relative to current levels): Using percentage-based adjustments can confuse what is absolute versus relative. I suggest using absolute values for clarity.

@lewis_kim Concerning the maximum allowable change per vote—1% or 0.1%: You’ve argued that 1% might be too significant, but to me, 0.1% seems negligible. Quarterly votes determine annual inflation rates, and adjusting by merely 0.1% effectively signals maintaining the status quo. External observers might even interpret it as a symbolic gesture. However, I’m also uncertain about endorsing a full 1%, so I’d appreciate broader input before settling this issue.

@lewis_kim @kaiasex Regarding ‘block reward distribution ratio’ and ‘block proposer selection’: These topics indeed closely relate to inflation. Unfortunately, these exceed my current capacity. I intended to address them here but struggled to integrate them effectively. If either of you can create a dedicated forum thread on these topics, I’ll actively engage there.

3 Likes

Thanks for your feedback.

From my understanding, the main difference in your new proposal is

  • As-Is: GC votes directly lead to inflation adjustments.
  • To-Be: GC votes suggest the number, and the foundation makes a final decision.

Please correct me if I have any wrong understandings.

And based on your comment, I have the following questions:

  1. I still think that creating concrete standards will be more effective than letting GCs suggest arbitrary numbers without a clear rationale. How do you think at this point?
  2. If we adjust the number by an absolute 1% (e.g., 5% → 4%), it can lead to a critical financial issue related to the foundation. We need to at least introduce a guard to prevent any aggressive adjustments.
  3. As I mentioned, the fundamental solution involves block proposer selection, but I think there’s no feedback on this so far. I completely understand it might be hard to cover all those things, so please share your idea once you’re ready.

And again, it’s happy to see this many members are engaged in our governance!

3 Likes