I think we also need to consider if it’s possible to let foundation decide the inflation number, which could directly influence on the market.
This is very important (actually critical) issue since it might be related to any security issue from the perspective of the SEC’s Howey test.
To fundamentally remove the issue, making the decision by standards defined/discussed by open governance would be necessary, rather than letting centralized entity to decide the specific number.
정말 좋은 제안입니다 카이아 체인은 좋은 기술력을 가지고 있지만 inflation은 카이아의 가치 상승에 제약으로 동작하고 있습니다 최근 미니댑을 통한 온체인 도약과 더불어 인플레이션 조정을 통해 더 나은 방향으로의 사업 진행 및 갸치 상승이 가능할 것으로 보입니다
It’s a really good suggestion. Kaia Chain has good technology, but inflation is acting as a constraint to the increase in Kaia’s value. With the recent on-chain leap through mini-dapps, it seems that the business can proceed in a better direction and the value can increase through inflation adjustment.
Really like this direction.
Averaging votes instead of binary choices makes it more inclusive and practical.
Excluding outliers + multisig veto = smart safeguards.
Dynamic inflation tied to real activity feels like the right long-term move.
I totally agree. I hope the reward distribution structure will be improved.
I’ve been having so much fun playing the Kaia Minidap game these days. Go Kaia!
Thank you very much for your detailed response.
First of all, let me clarify the confusion about absolute and relative values I previously mentioned. From now on, I’ll simply use ‘%p’ and ‘%.’ (Example: If the interest rate changes from 3% → 4%, that’s a 1%p increase, or a 33.3% increase.)
Your understanding of the ‘As-Is’ and ‘To-Be’ scenarios is spot-on. However, considering your mention of the Howey Test, I believe we should abandon the concept of the foundation having exclusive decision-making power under the ‘To-Be’ scenario.
I fully agree that governance members need clear standards for proposing numbers. However, I’m concerned whether governance members—who often struggle even with basic voting—can provide meaningful values, even with guidelines. Therefore, it seems crucial to clearly define penalties and incentives first, then consider guidelines afterward. Also, even without a written document, simply holding governance meetings managed by the foundation before dot-plot survey might be sufficient.
Regarding the absolute inflation adjustment value of ±1%p, I acknowledge that it is indeed aggressive. Nonetheless, I still feel the quarterly maximum of ±0.1%p you suggested is overly conservative, especially when considering the compound nature of inflation adjustments. For example, even at 5% inflation, it naturally becomes 4.7% within a year.
Thus, I’d like to re-propose the VISTA numerical adjustments as follows:
Relevant numerical references from other chains:
The important takeaway here is that discussions like these are becoming increasingly active in 2025, primarily focusing on ramping down inflation. It appears that, as chains mature, they naturally begin reevaluating inflation rates.
References:
※ Due to system limitations, I’m unable to share a direct link here.
For the reference link, please refer to the Twitter link I’ll post—same as in the initial proposal.
I provided specific numbers and didn’t just suggest ‘hold a governance meeting or let the foundation handle it’ because, as the original proposer of this issue, I don’t want to be irresponsible. So, please candidly point out if there are flaws in my suggestions. After all, my understanding of the foundation’s operations and principles isn’t as deep as yours.
Regarding the block proposer selection method, my thoughts are still incomplete, and I need more time to finalize them. My brain bandwidth feels limited right now.
Sorry for the late response.
First of all, as this discussion becomes more structured, I think we need a way to drive the actual results. It would be great if we could use the https://x.com/KaiaChain_KR/status/1933018563784421692 meetup or the community town hall.
I think 0.1%p per cycle is much more feasible. Before discussing the block proposer selection method, I’d like to hear the opinions of the GCs. Your feedback or idea would be greatly appreciated.
VCs’ silence( [ABGAasia] [AhnLab_ABC] [animocabrands] [binance] [bisonaiofficial][CertiK] [CosmostationVD][goldstation_io]
[delightlabs_io] [DOSI_official] [DWFLabs] [GGLabs_Official]
[HashKey_Global] [bora_ecosystem] [NeopinOfficial]
[NFTbank_ai] [Orbit_Chain] [Presto_Labs] [StableLab] [Swapscanner]
[Verichains][x2eall][WemixNetwork] [DoraHacks]
[maekyungsns]) on this proposal is disappointing and concerning. As key players in shaping the future of innovation on Kaia Chain, their refusal to even engage in public discourse—let alone provide constructive feedback—shows a lack of responsibility to both doboongkun and the broader community. If VCs want to be seen as true partners in progress, they need to speak up, participate, and help shape policies that impact the industries they claim to champion.
