[GP-20] Kaia Permissionless Network Policy (English)

* The Korean version is available here.

Governance Proposal Scope

This proposal is a governance proposal to establish the necessary policies for Kaia Network’s transition to a permissionless structure.

As part of the PGT (Permissionless · Governance · Tokenomics) roadmap, this proposal includes policies intended to reorganize the Validator participation structure and the Governance Council (GC) framework to align with a Permissionless environment.

This governance proposal consists of the following three policy sections described in the main body and proposes the Validator and Governance operational policies that will apply after the transition to the Kaia Permissionless network.

  1. Reorganization of the Validator & GC Structure in a Permissionless Environment

  2. Changes to the Governance Council Participation Model

  3. Permissionless Validator Operational Policy

These three policies together constitute a single integrated policy defining the Validator and Governance structure that will apply after Kaia’s transition to a Permissionless network.

The purpose of this proposal is to expand network participation while ensuring that Kaia Network continues to maintain its performance, stability, and governance accountability.

Policy Proposal

TL;DR

Under this policy proposal, the following key changes will be introduced as part of Kaia Network’s transition to a Permissionless structure.

  • Validator participation will be opened so that anyone who meets the qualification requirements can participate as a Validator.

  • The roles of Validator and Governance will be structurally separated.

  • An automatic GC registration system with a challenge-based verification process will be introduced.

  • Validator participation in consensus will be limited to the top 50 nodes based on total staking amount.

  • Validator operational performance and eligibility will be evaluated and managed through VRank.

More detailed explanations of each policy are provided in the main sections below.

1. Purpose of the Policy and Direction of the Permissionless Transition

This policy aims to define the policy framework for restructuring the Validator and Governance Council (GC) system as the Kaia Network transitions to a Permissionless structure.

As stated in the PGT Roadmap, Kaia’s transition to a Permissionless network is not merely an expansion of participation. Rather, it is a structural transformation designed to open participation while simultaneously maintaining high-performance chain operation and network stability.

Permissionless does not mean unlimited openness. It means expanding participation based on clear standards and defined responsibilities.

The objectives of the Permissionless transition are as follows.

  1. Expansion of Participation
  • Opening Validator Participation : The network will transition to a structure in which anyone who meets the required qualifications can participate as a Validator in network operations.
    This expands the scope of participation in network operations.

  • Reforming the GC Participation Structure : The GC participation structure will transition from the existing individual GC approval process to a system in which registration is automatically granted when predefined requirements are met. Accessibility is increased while maintaining the roles and responsibilities of GC.

  1. Designing the Balance Between Openness and Stability
  • If a Validator fails to fulfill its responsibility within the network consensus protocol, it will be excluded from participating in consensus.

  • In addition, in order to maintain the high performance and stability of the network, the number of Validators participating in consensus will be managed within a certain range.

  • The roles of Validator and GC are structurally separated to distinguish between network operation and decision-making authority. Through this structure, participation is opened while maintaining a governance model in which major decisions of the Kaia Network are operated based on the responsibility and role of GC.

Based on the direction defined above, the following sections define the detailed policies for Validators and GC.

2. Restructuring the Validator & GC Structure in a Permissionless Environment

Background and Structural Limitations

Under the previous Permissioned structure, only GC members could act as Validators, resulting in a restricted participation structure.

The GC approval process involved multiple layers including screening, reputation verification, and capability evaluation.
This structure was effective in securing network stability during the early stages.

However, as the network transitions to the next phase, the structure where Validator participation is tied to GC eligibility creates structural limitations in terms of expanding operational participation and decentralization.

When Validator participation is structurally bound to GC eligibility, the scalability of participation in network operations as a Validator becomes limited.

Restructuring the GC and Validator Roles in a Permissionless Model

In the Permissionless structure, the roles of Validator and GC are clearly separated.

Validators are entities that participate in network consensus and operate the network infrastructure. GC is the decision-making body that determines the policy and direction of the Kaia Network and leads ecosystem contribution and growth.

Accordingly,

  • Validators can participate even if they are not GC members, as long as they meet the required qualifications.

  • GC participation is conducted through a separate condition-based registration process.

  • GC participation assumes Validator operational responsibility, with governance roles added on top of that responsibility.

Governance determines critical matters such as network policy, structural changes, tokenomics, and security.
These decisions directly affect the consensus structure and technical stability of the network.

If decision-making authority is granted to entities that do not directly perform network operational responsibilities, a gap may arise between network operation and governance decision-making, weakening the accountability structure for network risk.

For this reason, GC membership assumes Validator operational responsibility, structurally linking decision-making authority with network operational responsibility.

However, while operational responsibility and governance authority must be connected, participation as a Validator does not automatically grant governance authority.

A structure where governance authority is automatically granted simply by participating as a Validator could reduce governance to a function of network operation. Governance is a higher-level role responsible for determining the strategic direction of the network, and therefore must be managed separately with minimum qualification requirements and responsibilities.

In summary, Validators represent an operational role based on responsibility for network operation, while GC represents a higher role that adds governance authority on top of that responsibility.
The two roles are separated but organically connected within the same responsibility framework.

3. Definition of GC and Validator Roles in the Kaia Network

After the Permissionless transition, the Kaia Network needs to clearly define and structurally distinguish the roles of Validators and GC. As the network moves into a growth phase, it becomes increasingly important to clarify the scope of operational participation and governance authority.

In particular, the following must be clearly defined in a Permissionless environment.

  • Who participates in network operations

  • Who performs critical governance decisions

  • How these two roles are connected

  • How rewards and responsibilities are distinguished

Accordingly, this section defines the roles, authorities, responsibilities, and reward structures of Validators and GC in the Kaia Network.

Category Validator Governance Council
Definition Network operation participant Decision-making body and ecosystem contribution entity
Core Role Participation in consensus protocol

Maintaining network stability
Determining network policies and direction

Decision-making on structural changes and tokenomics

Driving ecosystem growth
Decision Authority None Yes (possesses governance voting rights)
Network Operation Role Yes Yes (Validator role assumed)
Participation Method Participation allowed upon meeting qualification requirements Conditional automatic registration + confirmation after challenge period
Reward Structure
*The detailed reward policy will be defined in the Tokenomics policy.
Staking rewards
Network fees
Public delegation fees
Staking rewards
Network fees
Public delegation fees
Ecosystem contribution rewards and related fees
Purpose of Participation Participate in network infrastructure operation and contribute to consensus stability while receiving economic rewards Participate in strategic decision-making for the network and contribute to ecosystem growth while pursuing governance authority and rewards
Structural Meaning Participation structure centered on operational responsibility Higher-level role structure that adds governance authority on top of operational responsibility

4. Changes to GC Participation Structure

Background

Under the previous structure, GC participation followed the process below.

  • GC proposal submission → Manual GC information verification → GC voting approval

This structure was effective in ensuring network stability and trust during the early stages.
However, under a Permissionless model, it reveals structural limitations.

In particular, the GC voting approval model creates high uncertainty and entry barriers for new participants.

Even if new participants possess both the intention and capability to contribute, they may find it difficult to predict the timing or outcome of the approval process.
Approval decisions may also be influenced by existing members’ interests, information asymmetry, or reliance on symbolic value and reputation associated with GC membership.

Additionally, the preparation required for approval procedures can impose a significant operational burden.

As a result, capable participants may abandon or delay participation, which structurally limits the scalability of GC participation.

Therefore, GC participation must also be redesigned to support openness under the Permissionless model.
However, this does not mean unlimited openness, but rather a structural transition that preserves the role and responsibility of GC.

GC Participation and Registration Structure

This policy transitions GC participation to a Conditional Automatic Registration + Challenge-based verification model.

Once a GC applicant submits the required qualification information, the applicant is immediately registered as a provisional GC.
After a defined challenge period, if no objections are raised, the GC status is automatically confirmed.

Participation entry is automated, while a verification period ensures minimum trust requirements before final confirmation.

  • a. Application

    • Before applying for GC registration, the applicant must already be operating as a Validator in compliance with the Validator policy requirements.

    • GC Attestation registration must be completed (to prevent Sybil attacks and ensure minimum trust).

    • A GC proposal must be publicly submitted (including information identifying the GC entity).

    • Required information for GC activity must be registered (including on-chain activity information and contact points, to be submitted via Kaia Square).

  • b. Registration

    • Once the above requirements are satisfied, the registration process begins automatically without GC voting or foundation approval.

    • Upon registration, the applicant is assigned the status of Provisional GC. At this stage, GC membership is not yet finalized.

    • A Challenge Window is then opened. The default duration is 7 days, though it may be adjusted if necessary.

    • If no objections are raised during the challenge period, the applicant automatically becomes a Confirmed GC.

  • c. Challenge

    • The Challenge mechanism is a core control mechanism to mitigate risks that may arise from conditional automatic registration.

    • Its purposes include:

      • Preventing governance Sybil attacks and false participation

      • Ensuring public verification of minimum trust requirements for GC roles

    • Challenges may be raised by GC members or the foundation for the following reasons.

      • Errors or insufficient verification in attestation information

      • Insufficient or inappropriate GC proposal content

      • If a challenge is raised, the case is immediately submitted as a governance agenda and GC voting determines whether the registration will be revoked.

GC Removal

GC is not merely a registered status.
It is a role responsible for making decisions regarding network policy and direction while contributing to ecosystem growth.

Therefore, GC status is not permanently granted but must be maintained through continuous participation and responsibility.

GC may be removed under the following conditions.

  • a. Insufficient Governance Participation

    • GC members are expected to actively participate in governance decision-making. If a GC member fails to participate in five consecutive governance votes, the case will be submitted as a governance agenda and the GC status may be revoked through voting.
  • b. Loss of Validator Qualification

    • GC membership assumes Validator operational responsibility. If the Validator qualification is lost, GC membership is automatically revoked.
  • c. Attestation Invalidity

    • If critical errors are found in the attestation information or the trust requirements are not satisfied, the issue may be submitted as a governance agenda and GC status may be revoked through voting.
  • d. Malicious Behavior or Emergency Governance Action

    • If actions that damage the stability of the Kaia Network or its ecosystem are identified, the issue may be submitted as a governance agenda and GC status may be revoked through voting.

5. Validator Operational Policy in a Permissionless Environment

After the Permissionless transition, the Kaia Network aims to adopt an open structure where anyone can participate as a Validator.

However, since Kaia maintains a high-performance IBFT-based consensus mechanism, the number of Validators participating in consensus must be managed within a certain range to ensure technical stability and performance.

Participation as a Validator is open, but participation in consensus cannot be unlimited.

Key questions in a Permissionless environment include:

  • If anyone can become a Validator, how is consensus participation controlled?

  • How are nodes that degrade network performance managed?

The answers to these questions define the principles of the Validator operational policy.

The Kaia Permissionless Validator policy is designed to achieve both openness and network stability through two principles.

  • First, maintaining strict operational standards : Validators that degrade network performance or stability will be excluded from consensus participation.
    Permissionless participation does not mean relaxed operational standards.

  • **Second, economic responsibility-based selection :**When consensus participation slots are limited, Validators are selected through a staking-based competitive structure.

This structure assumes that anyone can participate, but only participants capable of fulfilling operational responsibility participate in consensus.

Validator Operational Policy

Operational State System

To clarify operational responsibility and reward structure, the following status system is defined.

  • 1 Epoch = 86,400 blocks (approximately 1 day).

  • Candidate : Node currently participating in VRank evaluation for Validator participation.

  • Validator Active : Participating in the consensus protocol.

  • Validator Inactive : Not participating in consensus.

Validator Promotion and Participation Structure

A Candidate may join the Validator Pool when the following requirements are satisfied.

  • Passing the VRank evaluation for 1 Epoch

  • Meeting the minimum staking requirement of 5,000,000 KAIA

These represent the minimum requirements for becoming a Validator, requiring both operational capability and economic responsibility. The maximum number of Validators in the Validator Pool is 100 (subject to adjustment).

Among them, a maximum of 50 Validators may actively participate in consensus.

  • If the total number of Validators is 50 or fewer, all participate in consensus.

  • If the number exceeds 50, the top 50 nodes by staking participate in consensus.(the total staking amount includes Public Delegation).

This structure maintains openness and competition simultaneously.

Participation is open, but consensus participation is selected based on economic responsibility and contribution.

Inactive Transition and Reward Principle

If a Validator participating in consensus fails to meet the VRank requirements or fails to participate in consensus, the Validator will transition to an Inactive state.

Rewards are distributed only to Active Validators.

No rewards are distributed in the Inactive state.

This ensures a direct link between operational responsibility and rewards.

Demotion

Validators will be demoted to Candidate status under the following conditions.

  • Immediate demotion if minimum staking requirements are violated

  • Conversion to Candidate status after approximately 30 days of continuous inactivity

If a GC is demoted to Candidate status, the GC qualification is also immediately revoked.

This ensures consistency with the structure where GC membership assumes Validator operational responsibility.

Malicious Behavior Response

The Kaia Network continuously monitors the operational status of Validators.

If malicious behavior is detected, the following actions may be taken.

  • Immediate demotion to Candidate

  • Public disclosure of the incident

  • Consideration of introducing a slashing mechanism through network governance

These measures strengthen network trust and economic security.

6. Appendix

Transition Procedure for Policy Proposal Under the Current GC Structure

This section provides reference information regarding the transition process from the current GC structure to the new Validator and Governance structure during the transition to a Permissionless network.

This section is not a policy rule, but an explanatory reference to help understand the expected operational procedures during the structural transition.

  • Policy Implementation Timing

    • This policy will be applied after the completion of the Permissionless transition. Expected timing: End of September 2026

      • Existing GC members will also be subject to the same policy framework as new GC members.
    • However, the reward structure will follow the Tokenomics policy, which is scheduled to be applied in July 2026. *The detailed reward policy will be addressed in the Tokenomics policy.

  • Retention of Existing GC Status

    • Current GC members will retain their GC status after the Permissionless transition without the need for reapplication.

    • In other words,

      • Existing GC members do not need to reapply through the new GC registration process.

      • The automatic registration structure applies only to new GC applicants.

  • Operational Environment Changes and Preparation Requirements

    • With the Permissionless transition, certain network operational structures will change. Existing GC operators will need to prepare accordingly.

    • Major expected changes include:

      • Staking contract updates

      • Changes resulting from core client updates

    • Detailed guides and technical documentation will be announced in advance, ensuring that existing GC operators have sufficient preparation time.

* Revision History:

Apr 25, 2026 – Section 3: Updated the definitions of GC and Validator roles in the Kaia Network, as well as the Validator public delegation fee details.

더 이해가 안 되는 부분이 있습니다.

이번 Permissionless 정책에서는 Validator 참여 조건으로 최소 500만 KAIA 보유를 요구하고 있습니다.

그렇다면 지금 신규 GC 후보들에게 재단이 500만 KAIA를 위임해 주는 것은 논리적으로 모순 아닌가요?

몇 달 뒤에는 자기 자본으로 500만 KAIA를 보유해야 Validator가 될 수 있다고 하면서, 지금은 왜 재단 자산으로 그 조건을 대신 충족시켜 주고 있는 것입니까?

더구나 500만 KAIA는 과거에는 큰 금액이었을지 몰라도, 지금은 상황이 다릅니다.

KAIA 가격은 고점 대비 99% 이상 폭락했습니다.

그 과정에서 수많은 장기 투자자들은 막대한 손실을 감수했습니다.

그 결과 지금의 500만 KAIA는 과거와 비교하면 훨씬 작은 금액이 되었습니다.

그런데도 스스로를 글로벌 기업이라고 소개하고, 수백만 사용자와 대기업 파트너십을 자랑하는 기업들이 그 정도 금액조차 자기 자본으로 투자하지 않겠다고 말합니다.

솔직히 이해하기 어렵습니다.

카이아의 미래를 믿는다면 직접 투자하고 Stakeholder가 되는 것이 정상 아닙니까?

왜 재단은 자기 돈으로도 500만 KAIA를 투자할 의사가 없는 기업들에게 거버넌스 권한과 Validator 지위를 얻을 수 있도록 길을 열어주고 있는 것입니까?

신규 GC를 환영하기 전에, 재단은 먼저 이 정책적 모순에 대해 설명해야 한다고 생각합니다.


There is something I genuinely do not understand.

Under the new Permissionless policy, a Validator must hold at least 5 million KAIA to participate.

If that is the direction Kaia is moving toward, then why is the Foundation currently delegating 5 million KAIA to new GC applicants?

Isn’t that a logical contradiction?

On one hand, the new policy says Validators should meet the minimum staking requirement using their own economic commitment.

On the other hand, the Foundation is effectively satisfying that requirement on behalf of new applicants.

Which principle is the Foundation actually trying to uphold?

Furthermore, while 5 million KAIA may have represented a significant amount in the past, the situation today is very different.

KAIA has fallen more than 99% from its peak.

Long-term investors have already endured devastating losses throughout that process.

As a result, 5 million KAIA today is a fraction of what it once represented.

Yet companies that describe themselves as global leaders, backed by major investors, serving millions of users, and operating large-scale businesses are still unwilling to invest even that amount of their own capital.

Frankly, that is difficult to understand.

If they truly believe in the future of Kaia, shouldn’t becoming a stakeholder through direct investment be the most natural first step?

Why is the Foundation opening the door to governance influence and validator status for companies that are unwilling to invest even the minimum amount required under the future Permissionless model?

Before welcoming new GC members, I believe the Foundation should first explain this policy contradiction.

@minje_mun 님, 안녕하세요. Kaia 재단 Governance 담당자입니다. 최근 포럼에 올라온 안건 및 공지사항에 남겨주신 의견 잘 읽어보았습니다. 제기해 주신 이슈는 크게 세 가지 정도로 정리해볼 수 있을 것 같은데요, 가장 최근에 남겨주신 댓글인 이곳에 종합적으로 답변해 드립니다.

이슈 1. 신규 GC의 자기자본 투자 없는 재단 위임 요청

신규 GC에 대한 KAIA 위임은 현행 GC 온보딩 구조 내에서 허용된 방식입니다. 이는 자산의 소유권 이전이 아닌 GC 활동을 지원하기 위한 장치이며, GC 활동 종료 시 위임된 물량은 전액 회수됩니다.

물론 자기자본 투자가 재단과 GC 간의 이해관계 일치를 보여주는 신호라는 점에는 깊이 공감합니다. 다만 신규 GC를 온보딩할 때에는 자기자본 투자 여부뿐만 아니라 밸리데이터 운영, 인프라 지원, 유저 온보딩, 시장 확장, 기술 통합 등 Kaia 생태계에 대한 실질적인 기여 가능성이 종합적으로 고려되어야 한다고 생각합니다.

참고로 재단은 제한된 재원을 효율적으로 운용하기 위해 위임 결정 시 과거에 비해 더욱 엄격한 검토를 거쳐 선별적으로 진행하고 있습니다. 2025년 초부터 현재까지 해당 구조는 Google Cloud와 Xangle 두 곳에만 적용되었습니다. 금번 Kaia Square 투표로 통과된 Alchemy와 Hashport 역시 기술적 역량, 생태계 기여도, 장기적 협업 가능성 측면에서 충분한 자격을 갖춘 파트너라고 판단하고 있습니다.

이슈 2. 기존 GC 성과에 대한 트래킹 부재

기존 GC들의 활동 실적 및 보상 내역에 대한 공개 요구는 타당하다고 생각합니다. 커뮤니티가 GC의 개별 기여도를 직관적으로 확인하기 어렵다는 점은 재단에서도 핵심 개선 과제로 인식하고 있습니다.

현재도 스테이킹 현황과 투표 참여율 등 온체인 데이터는 공개되어 있습니다만, 최근 통과된 GP-21의 CR (Contribution Reward) 도입을 기점으로 GC들의 고정 보상 구조가 개편됩니다. 앞으로는 TVL 기여, KAIA 스테이킹에 대한 기여, 유저 스테이킹/위임 기여, 그 외 생태계 활성화 등 검증 가능한 지표를 중심으로 한 기여 기반 보상 구조로 전환될 예정입니다.

이슈 3. 거버넌스 프로세스의 형식화 및 커뮤니티 소외

GC 신청 프로세스는 공개 포럼을 통해 진행되며, 커뮤니티 구성원 누구나 이의를 제기할 수 있도록 열려 있습니다. 신청 안건이 투표에 부쳐지기 위해서는 기존 GC의 지지(endorsement)가 필수적이며, 이는 무분별한 진입을 방지하는 최소한의 검증 장치로 기능하고 있습니다.

또한 지지를 확보한 팀은 월간 GC 미팅에서 직접 Kaia 생태계 기여 계획을 발표하고 질의응답을 진행합니다. 포럼상의 댓글들이 다소 형식적으로 보일 수 있다는 점은 충분히 이해합니다만, 실제 심의는 복수의 채널을 통해 다각도로 이루어지고 있습니다.

충분한 답변이 되었기를 바라며, 향후 프로세스 개선과 관련하여 좋은 제안이 있으시다면 또 의견 남겨주시기를 바랍니다. 감사합니다.

재단 답변은 잘 읽었습니다. 하지만 제가 제기한 핵심 우려는 여전히 해소되지 않았습니다.

첫째, 재단은 "신규 GC에 대한 위임은 현행 온보딩 구조 내에서 허용된 방식이며, 종료 시 원금은 회수된다"고 설명했습니다. 하지만 제가 비판하는 것은 위임된 물량의 회수 여부가 아닙니다. 바로 그런 구조를 허용한 거버넌스 자체가 문제라는 것입니다.

현재 KAIA의 가장 큰 문제는 신뢰 부족과 지속적인 매도 압력입니다. 그런데 재단은 자기 자본 투자 없이도 GC가 될 수 있도록 하고, 재단 물량으로 스테이킹 수익을 얻을 수 있도록 허용하고 있습니다.

원금이 회수된다는 사실은 중요하지 않습니다. 시장이 우려하는 것은 그 과정에서 발생하는 보상과 수익입니다. GC는 위임받은 물량에서 발생한 수익을 운영비로 사용할 것이고, 결국 상당 부분은 시장에서 매도될 가능성이 높습니다.

결국 재단은 "원금은 회수된다"는 이유로 이해관계 정렬이 부족한 구조를 정당화하고 있습니다.

오히려 저는 반대로 묻고 싶습니다.

현재 재단은 운영비 마련을 위해 매달 약 1,000만 KAIA 규모를 시장에 공급하고 있습니다. 그렇다면 GC가 되겠다는 기업이 500만 KAIA 정도를 직접 매수하는 것이 왜 불가능합니까?

KAIA의 미래를 이야기하는 기업이라면 최소한의 자본 투자와 리스크 부담은 보여주는 것이 정상 아닙니까?

"규정상 가능하다"는 것은 설명이 될 수는 있어도 정당화가 될 수는 없습니다. 커뮤니티가 묻고 있는 것은 그 규정이 과연 KAIA 투자자와 생태계에 바람직한 구조인가 하는 점입니다.

둘째, 재단은 앞으로 CR 제도를 통해 성과를 측정하겠다고 설명했습니다. 하지만 커뮤니티가 궁금한 것은 미래가 아니라 과거입니다. TRALA, NIGHT FURY 등 과거에 집행된 생태계 자금은 어떤 성과를 냈습니까? 예를 들어 TRALA의 경우 약 800만 KLAY 규모의 토큰 스왑이 이루어졌지만 이후 토큰 가격은 30분의 1 이하로 폭락했고 현재는 사실상 가치가 거의 남아 있지 않습니다. 당시 투자 판단의 근거는 무엇이었고, 현재 재단은 이를 성공으로 평가합니까 실패로 평가합니까? 왜 지금까지 이에 대한 공개적인 사후 평가가 없습니까?

셋째, 거버넌스가 형식적이지 않다고 말씀하셨지만 외부에서는 그렇게 보입니다. 거의 모든 안건이 통과되고 있으며, 어떤 반대 의견이 있었고 어떤 검증이 이루어졌는지 커뮤니티는 알 수 없습니다. "내부에서 충분히 논의했다"는 설명만으로는 신뢰를 얻기 어렵습니다. 심의 과정과 근거가 공개되지 않는다면 거수기라는 비판은 계속 나올 수밖에 없습니다.

저는 KAIA를 공격하려는 것이 아닙니다. 오히려 살리고 싶습니다. 지금 필요한 것은 새로운 발표가 아니라 시장 신뢰 회복, 가격 하락 방어, 그리고 과거 의사결정에 대한 설명과 책임이라고 생각합니다.

I have carefully read the Foundation’s response. However, my core concerns remain unresolved.

First, the Foundation explains that delegating KAIA to new GC members is permitted under the current onboarding structure and that all delegated principal will be returned when GC participation ends. However, my criticism is not about whether the principal is returned. My concern is that the governance framework itself allows such a structure in the first place.

The biggest issue facing KAIA today is a lack of market confidence and continuous sell pressure. Yet the Foundation allows organizations to become GC members without making a meaningful capital commitment of their own while still benefiting from staking rewards generated through Foundation-delegated tokens.

Whether the principal is eventually returned is not the key issue. What concerns the market are the rewards and income generated during the delegation period. Those rewards will likely be used to fund operations and, in practice, a significant portion will ultimately be sold on the market.

In effect, the Foundation is using the fact that “the principal will be returned” to justify a structure that lacks meaningful alignment of interests.

So I would ask the opposite question.

The Foundation is reportedly selling approximately 10 million KAIA per month to fund operational and personnel expenses. If that is the case, why is it unreasonable to expect companies seeking GC membership to purchase at least 5 million KAIA with their own capital?

If an organization truly believes in KAIA’s future, shouldn’t it demonstrate at least a minimal level of capital commitment and risk-sharing?

Saying that something is “allowed under the rules” may explain the process, but it does not justify the design of the process itself. What the community is asking is whether this structure is actually beneficial for KAIA investors and the ecosystem.

Second, the Foundation states that future contribution-based reward systems such as CR will improve accountability. However, the community’s questions are about the past, not the future. What tangible results were achieved from ecosystem funds already deployed into projects such as TRALA and NIGHT FURY? In the case of TRALA, approximately 8 million KLAY worth of tokens were reportedly swapped, yet the token subsequently lost more than 97% of its value and is now effectively worthless. What was the investment thesis behind this decision? Does the Foundation consider it a success or a failure? Why has there been no public post-mortem evaluation or accountability regarding these decisions?

Third, while the Foundation argues that governance is not merely a formality, that is not how it appears from the outside. Nearly every proposal passes. The community cannot see what objections were raised, what concerns were discussed, or what standards were applied during the review process. Simply stating that discussions occurred internally is not sufficient to build trust. Without greater transparency regarding deliberations and decision-making processes, criticism that governance functions as a rubber-stamp mechanism will inevitably continue.

I am not trying to damage KAIA. On the contrary, I want to see it succeed.

What KAIA needs today is not another announcement or marketing campaign. It needs restored market confidence, protection against continuous price deterioration, and clear accountability for past decisions.